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Introduction
“It will be a new era that sees China moving closer to the center stage 
and making greater contributions to mankind” said Chinese President Xi 
Jinping in 2017 during a speech given to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
(Xinhua 2017). This speech presents not only the position that China wants to 
achieve in the international scenario, but also a part of the country’s strategy. 
Chinese growth in recent years has impacted its behavior on the international 
scene, which changed considerably in the 21st century and, especially, after 
the 2008 crisis (Zhao 2015; Oliveira 2019). The Asian giant began to explore 
its strategic regional maritime environment, entering into conflicts with the 
countries of the South China Sea and the East China Sea in the search for 
maritime territories and islands that could not only hold important energy 
resources, but safeguard its oceanic lines (Cole 2015; Oliveira 2019).
 In addition, associated with the Chinese maritime strategy (Brady 
2014; Brady 2017), the Asian dragon started to act more decisively in the 
icy regions of the planet, stimulating a geopolitical and geoeconomic race 
towards the future access to strategic resources and maritime transport lines. 
Spaces such as Antarctica and the Arctic have become the scene of geopolitical 
disputes between countries, especially since China started to insert itself more 
assertively on such international strategic theaters in the 21st century. The 
geopolitics of the sea and the geopolitics of ice are new themes that emerge in 
the academy due to the interests of great powers to strengthen their presence 
and explore these regions (Becker 2004; Brady 2014; 2017; Zhou 2019).
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 Despite the fact that both polar territories have different characteristics, 
they represent regions that have not yet been fully exploited by the states of the 
international system. Considering the Antarctic, the focus of this article, no 
country has sovereignty over its territory and no war has been fought over it. 
About 98% of the continent is covered by ice (average thickness of more than 
2,000 m), which makes it difficult to extract resources from the region under 
the ice layer present there. However, even so, there are studies that indicate 
the potentialities of the region which would be rich in strategic resources 
such as oil, uranium and water, for example (Brady 2014; 2017).
 In the face of the increased geopolitical pressure that China has been 
exercising on the most diverse international chessboards, this article aims 
to contribute to a greater debate on the Chinese strategy for the Antarctic 
security strategic theater. In this sense, the starting point of this article is the 
following question: what are the Chinese strategies for the Antarctic region 
in the 21st century and what is the possibility of conflict in the region due 
to these interests? Furthermore, the article also aims to present a Brazilian 
perspective to think about the Antarctic region and the possible implications 
of a geopolitical race in the region for its government. In this sense, the article 
also seeks to answer a second question about: What are the effects of China’s 
more active insertion in Antarctica for the world and, above all, for Brazil 
when the Brazilian strategic interests for the region are considered?
 In order to answer such questions, the present article intends to be 
analytical and propose questions, understanding the geopolitics of the region 
and the strategy of China and analyzing its links with the rise of Xi Jinping’s 
China. For this, the article opens with a mix of theoretical frameworks, 
opposing realist writers, especially John Mearsheimer (2014), of classical 
geopolitics, mainly Michael Klare (2008) and also José Luís Fiori’s based 
on its theory of global power (2004; 2008; 2013; 2014). It also presents a 
qualitative analysis to understand the Chinese performance in the Antarctic 
and the relevance of this region in the foreign policy of the Asian giant.
The Antarctic and the (Re)Definition of Territory: The 
Geopolitics of Ice
The Antarctic is a region that geographically covers about 14 million 
km2, being larger than Australia and Europe, and has a coast of almost 18 
thousand km2, holding approximately 70% of the world’s fresh water. Also, 
it is a region whose surrounding seas have plenty of natural and mineral 
resources. Historically, from the end of the 18th century until the middle of 
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the 19th, the exploration of the Antarctic and its surroundings was guided by 
trade interests, especially by the hunting of marine mammals (Ferreira 2009, 
26). It was only after the first scientific expeditions to the continent that took 
place at the end of the 19th century that territorial claims began to emerge, 
with the United Kingdom being the first country to officially claim part of the 
Antarctic territory. Followed by the United Kingdom, New Zealand (1923), 
France (1924), Australia (1933), Norway (1939), Chile (1940) and Argentina 
(1940) formalized their territorial interests on the continent (Ferreira 2009 , 
26-27; Dodds 2016, 426-427).
 In the post-World War II period, it was affected by bipolarity, and a 
resolution around the Antarctic was defined and stimulated by the interests 
of the USA and the USSR for the region. Between 1946-1947, for example, 
the USA carried out one of the largest expeditions to the region, the so-called 
Operation High Jump, while the USSR organized the Slava Flotilla expedition 
in 1946 (Ferreira 2009).
 One of the first authors to debate Antarctic geopolitics in international 
journals was John Andrews in his 1957 article entitled “Antarctic Geopolitics” 
for the Australian Outlook. The author presents the main reasons that 
would give a new meaning to the Antarctic territory in the post-World War 
II world. This reframing involved territorial representations (imaginations) 
and political-strategic issues (economic, trade and military) (Dodds 2016). As 
the demands grew in the course of the 20th century and exploratory missions 
to map, photograph and to establish bases in the Antarctic increased (Dodds 
2016), the Antarctic region started to gain strategic importance for navigation 
in the southern hemisphere.
 The region has gained more and more relevance, especially consider 
the prospects of what the region could offer in the future. As Andrews 
(1957, 4-5) presents, the waters that surround the continent were (and are) 
rich in marine life, but their exploitation was still remote and extremely 
difficult. Studies that pointed out the existence of resources due to geological 
exploration considered the possibility that significant amounts of resources 
such as coal, copper, iron ores and others exist in the region. However, its 
commercial exploitation was still risky in view of the few research that had 
been conducted on Antarctic soil and its surroundings (Ferreira 2009, 76). In 
1973, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) presented that in the seas 
of Bellinghausen, Ross and Weddell Sea the existence of 45 billion barrels 
of oil and 115 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (Mitchell 1977, 91) could be 
estimated. Furthermore, there are similar indications, compared to other 
hydrocarbon-rich regions, based on the continental drift thesis, that could 
lead to a hydrocarbon´s reserves.
 Nowadays, the technology to explore oil in the marine environments 
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already exists, but the greater difficulties of exploration the Antarctic, due to 
deeper and turbulent waters, indicate higher costs of exploration. (Ferreira 
2009, 76; Andrews 1957, 5; Brady 2017). The discovery of oil and gas on the 
Atlantic coast of Africa and of South America, corroborate the possibility that 
sediments and similar accumulations of these resources have occurred along 
the Antarctic coasts. Other projections are made regarding resources in the 
region are based on geographical history. After all, according to the continental 
drift thesis, the Antarctic region was a part of the other continents for millions 
of years (Gondwana) and it is postulated that most of the continent was linked 
to South Africa, India and Australia - regions known for the existence of 
natural resources (Ferreira 2009; Brady 2017).
 The difficulty in reaching a consensus on the legal status of the 
Antarctic in the 1950s led the International Council of Scientific Unions 
(ICSU) to decide to promote the International Geophysical Year (IGY), which 
brought together researchers from sixty-six countries around the world in an 
international research and scientific cooperation effort. This event prompted 
the convening of an international conference to definitively solve the situation 
of the continent. The countries participating in the meeting were the USA, 
the USSR and the nations that had established scientific bases in the region 
during the IGY - South Africa, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, 
Japan, Norway, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (Ferreira 2009, 39-50).
 At that time, the Antarctic Treaty was signed in Washington in 1959. 
Based on this agreement, the signatory countries that carry out activities in 
the Antarctic committed themselves to further the dialogue about the use 
of the continent “exclusively for peaceful purposes”. In its fourteen articles, 
the Treaty comprises the prohibition of military activities (such as the 
establishment of military bases or weapons testing), the freedom to continue 
scientific research, the promotion of international scientific cooperation, and 
several other points. The assumptions that created the Antarctic Treaty soon 
expanded, inaugurating a series of rules and interconnected regulations, and 
a regime, creating what is now known as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).
 Over the years, countries have become signatories of the Antarctic 
Treaty and participated in the international regime related to that territory. 
Currently, the Antarctic Treaty has 53 signatory countries and also envisage the 
accession of any UN member country - where 29 are consultative members for 
being original signatories or for conducting substantial scientific research on 
the continent (Brazil and China are included in this category). In the aftermath 
of Treaty, three conventions emerged to regulate the rational use of natural 
resources - the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (1972), the 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Living Marine Resources (1980) 
and the Convention on the Regulation of Activities on Resources Antarctic 
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Minerals (1988 - which did not come into force) (Ferreira 2009).
 Andrews (1957) argues about how the region’s claims and increased 
relevance in the period were shaped essentially by growing fears about the 
future, what the region could become (or could offer from a political, military, 
economic and commercial point of view) and not necessarily by what the 
region was. If Andrews’ statements in 1957 pointed to predictions about a 
future scenario of the Antarctic economic and commercial relevance, that 
scenario continued to permeate the region’s ideas of territoriality. It is not 
by chance that the evolution of the ATS culminated in the adoption of the 
Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (1991), which 
bans mineral activities in the Antarctic and concedes to the region the status 
of “International Nature Reserve dedicated to Science and Peace”, postponing 
the discussion on the commercial and resource exploitation of the region 
until 2048 (Article 25).
 The possibility of the future exploitation of strategic resources in 
an international scenario where demands tend to increase in the face of the 
development and growth of nations is a theme commonly addressed in classical 
geopolitics, especially by authors like Michael Klare (2008) who presents a 
pessimistic world view on the access to natural and strategic resources in the 
long run. The rise of new powers in the international system such as China, 
India and others, coupled with the increase in energy requirements to meet 
domestic demands, have caused great instability and staggered territorial 
conflicts.
Until recently, the global search for vital resources had been dominated 
almost entirely by mature industrialized powers. Three centers of 
economic power - the United States, Japan and Europe - devoured most 
of the oil, natural gas, coal, uranium and other primary energy sources 
used worldwide, along with disproportionate amounts of other industrial 
commodities like iron ores, copper, aluminum and tin. In the past decade, 
however, young competitors have forced their way onto the scene with 
starving economies that devour huge amounts of raw materials just to 
sustain their explosive growth rates. The emergence of these new assertive 
consumers has completely changed the field of dispute over resources 
(Klare 2008, 63).
With the changes in the system and the rise of new countries 
economically and politically, regions such as Africa, South America and 
Southeast Asia itself received the attention of the Great Powers. After all, as 
Klare mentions (2008, 33), not only has the consumption and demand for 
energy and other vital resources reached unprecedented levels, several of the 
reserves in place are  being drained visibly, faster than new reserves can be put 
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into operation. In view of this geopolitical dynamic, authors have presented 
the revitalization of the importance of the Antarctic region, like a promised 
“Eldorado” - places with stocks of natural and strategic wealth, therefore being 
on the range of future great powers struggles (Becker), or at least, as one last 
promised frontier of exploration.
 Thus, there are currently 84 main research facilities on the continent, 
with countries such as China having more space on the frozen continent 
(COMNAP 2020). According to the data from the Council of Managers of 
National Antarctic Programs (2020), China is currently increasing the 
number of bases in Antarctica and today is the 4th country with the largest 
number of positions.
Graphic 1: Number of Stations and Fields in Antarctica by Country
Source: Self elaboration based on COMNAP (2020).
Chinese Foreign Policy and Strategic Interests Towards the 
Antarctic in the 21st Century
China does not formally claim the Antarctic region, but has gradually 
expanded its presence and operations over the years. Currently, the Chinese 
government spends more than any other state on new infrastructure in the 
region, building bases, airplanes, icebreakers, etc. (Zhou 2019; Brady 2017). 
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Reflecting about a future scenario of scarcity, it is relevant to analyze how 
the Chinese action in the region has developed and which are the future 
obstacles that it could bring as a possible revisionist actor (even if others may 
also emerge and enter the dispute) in the region.
 Currently, China maintains four research stations in Antarctica, being 
the Great Wall (1985), the first, located on the island of King George, where 
there is also the only Brazilian station known as Comandante Ferraz. The 
other three stations Zhougshan (1989), Kunlun (2009) and Taishan (2014) 
are located further east in the Antarctic and are located in areas claimed by 
Australia. In the case of the Kunlun base, the Chinese government intends 
to use these bases and others in its national satellite system in the future, the 
BeiDou (Brady 2017).
 China is seeking to build a fifth base in the bay of Newfoundland, 
located in the New Zealand claim region, which would establish a strategic 
physical location for the possibility to explore the resources of the Ross Sea. 
The growing Chinese presence in the Antarctic also shows in the numbers of 
Chinese tourists visiting the continent. Between 2018-2019, more than eight 
thousand Chinese citizens visited the Antarctic, representing 15% of the total 
tourists in the period (IAATO 2020). According to Brady (2014, 20) China is 
the second country with the largest number of tourists, scientists, fishermen 
and employees working in the Antarctic.
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Figure 1: Map of the Bases of all Countries Located in the Antarctic2
Source: COMNAP (2020).
The Chinese state is a key player in China’s expansion into icy theaters 
and in recent years, especially during Xi Jinping’s government, icy lands 
appear to be gaining prominence in China’s grand strategy3. The key role of 
2 Locations underlined in red are China’s bases. Localities underlined in green are the Brazilian bases. 
3 Grand strategies involve prioritizing foreign policy goals, identifying existing and potential resources and 
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the State of China in this process of expansion is supported by the theory of 
Global Power. In this perspective, the capitalist action is coordinated by the 
State according to its interests in accumulating power and given the systemic 
pressures that it suffers in the international environment (Fiori 2004; 2008). 
In the case of the Arctic such a glimpse becomes more apparent with the 
ideas and debates on the Polar Silk Road after the launch of the White Book 
on Chinese policy for the Arctic (SC 2018).
The relevance of the Antarctic and the polar regions to China has 
grown and can be seen in the last two of the country’s five-year plan: 2011-
2015 and 2016-2020. China’s latest five-year plan  focus on building China’s 
polar scientific credibility and infrastructure, and in the case of the 13th plan, 
the polar issue gained more prominence than in previous years - presenting 
the Chinese interest in establishing a new research station in the Antarctic, 
advance in ice breakers technologies, increase air capacities in the Antarctic, 
among others (NDRC 2020). These plans have been drawn up every five years 
since 1953, establishing goals and economic and social development policies 
to ensure that national strategies keep pace with changes over the years in 
China and on the international stage.
In recent years, China’s perceptions of the international system have 
shown that the Asian giant’s fears about ongoing security dilemmas. In the 
2019 Chinese white paper it is pointed out that “major countries around 
the world are readjusting their security and military strategies and military 
organizational structures. They are developing new types of combat forces 
to seize the strategic commanding heights in military competition ”(SC 
2019). In addition, the document states that one of China’s main objectives 
is to strengthen national defense and constitute a military power compatible 
with the country’s international position and its security and development 
interests.
 With the increase in global demand due to the growth in population, 
the global energy crisis and advances in technology/extraction methods, 
and the increase of global warming, the Antarctic region may become the 
epicenter of a geopolitical conflict in the future. After all, while the region 
is rich in biodiversity and living resources, the Antarctic also holds potential 
mineral resources and even the possibility of extracting resources from it. 
Brady (2017, 10) suggests that China has been building research bases in 
areas which it identifies as strategic and rich in natural resources.
selecting a plan or script that uses these resources to achieve those goals. Grand strategy is the inevitable 
process of classifying and evaluating these interests, threats and resources (Oliveira 2019). We consider 
great strategies as a calculated relationship between ends and means with the aim of increasing national 
power or its security.
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 According to Zhao (2015, 261), the changes in Chinese foreign 
policy since the 2008 crisis have become increasingly evident. Since the 
government of Hu Jintao, China has transformed its foreign policy stance 
and, following Xi Jinping’s rise to power, it is becoming increasingly visible 
the change of a previous “taoguang yanghui” stance - to keep the profile low 
-, closely associated with Chinese politics since Deng Xiaoping ,- towards a 
“yousuo zuowei” - actively doing something (Masuda 2016; Zhao 2015, 261). 
Xi Jinping has transformed Chinese foreign policy, emphasizing strategies 
for the internationalization of the country and its economy, in the search for 
more power and wealth in the international arena.
To build a new model of relations between great powers, China 
has been behaving as one, especially in its close regional environment, in 
Asia-Pacific, and its aspiration is determined by the increase of its relative 
power in the international arena (Zhao 2015, 265 ; Oliveira 2019, 238-240). 
According to Brady (2017), the geopolitics of the Antarctic is undergoing 
major transformations and there are suspicions about China’s engagement in 
undeclared military activities in the Antarctic. Also, according to the author, 
China has sought recognition for the fact that it is now a “polar state”, that is, 
a power active in the Arctic and the Antarctic, and this point was expressed 
when Xi Jinping spoke in Australia in November 2014.
China’s leaders see their country’s expanding polar presence as a way 
to demonstrate China’s growing global power and gain international 
recognition for this new status. In the Chinese political system, polar affairs 
are part of maritime affairs, making the great polar power an essential 
component of China’s maritime strategy (Brady 2017, 5, our translation).
Regarding China’s performance in the Antarctic, it should also be 
noted that the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) of China has been the 
government department responsible for China’s polar activities since 2008. 
Nestled under the Ministry of Land Resources, the Administration manages 
activities in the Arctic and the Antarctic, dealing with tasks like supervising 
research, expeditions and logistics. Affiliated to SOA is the Chinese Arctic 
and Antarctic Administration (CAA) which performs the general function of 
organizing expeditions to the Arctic and the Antarctic and science programs 
across the country, managing Arctic and Antarctic affairs, participating 
in international organizations and promoting international collaboration 
in the polar field on behalf of SOA. In addition to it, there is also the Polar 
Research Institute of China (PRIC) which is an institute for polar research, 
logistical operation and data processing. PRIC is responsible for conducting 
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some scientific programs, carrying out some exploration operations and daily 
management of the station, as well as managing the Chinese polar science 
database and the publication of articles in the area (COMNAP 2020).
 The Chinese National Antarctic Program is largely organized in 
a 5-year program called “Chinese Polar Environment Comprehensive 
Investigation and Assessment Programs”, approved by SOA. In the Antarctic, 
the Program comprises three parts: the Antarctic Marine Environment 
Survey, the Antarctic Terrestrial Environment Survey and the Comprehensive 
Assessment of the Antarctic Environment. In addition, SOA coordinates the 
Chinese Advisory Committee for Polar Research (CACPR), which serves as an 
important governmental coordination body on polar issues. The State Oceanic 
Administration is also the interface with the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) and this administration also oversees China’s maritime 
surveillance (SOA 2019). This department also outlines China’s maritime 
laws and regulations and facilitates China’s participation in international 
maritime treaties. The SOA’s political position has increased in recent years 
largely because its maritime law enforcement agency, the China Maritime 
Surveillance (CMS), is one of the several fleets designated to patrol disputed 
waters in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and the South China Sea.
 Although the importance of the seas surrounding China and the polar 
regions is not comparable in some ways, it can be inferred about how the 
polar affairs, being under the supervision of such an agency, connect some 
of the Chinese maritime interests and their continuous expansion of defense 
capabilities in the Indo-Asia-Pacific with the polar regions. In fact, it is too early 
to argue that China already has a more assertive strategy towards the Antarctic. 
However, considering the growing Chinese performance in the most varied 
strategic theaters and its interests in natural resources, its growing presence 
in the Antarctic would be a reflection of what the region may become in the 
future. From a point of view similar to realist theorists such as Mearsheimer 
(2014), who argue about the search for the maximization of power, and, also 
considering José Luís Fiori’s theory of global power (2005; 2008), the search 
for power and wealth in the international arena brings us to a future scenario 
in which the Antarctic region can potentially be disputed by the great powers.
 In the face of the anarchy of the international system, the rise of 
China is likely to cause or inevitably would cause instability and conflict 
(Mearsheimer, 2014). Just as Thucydides considered the Peleponesian War 
inevitable due to the rise of Athens and the decline of Sparta’s relative power, 
several authors (Gilpin 1981; Farias 2020; Allison 2017; Mearsheimer 2014; 
Oliveira 2021) argue about the repetition of history. In this case, the rise of 
China and the loss of relative power in the USA will contribute towards the 
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trend of a new conflict - economic, technological, military and social.
 In Mearsheimer’s pessimistic argument (2014, 21), the author points 
out that the Great Powers behave aggressively not because they want to, but 
because they have to, in order to achieve more power accumulation if they 
want to maximize their chances of survival. After all, the international system 
creates incentives for states to seek opportunities to gain more power at the 
expense of their rivals. Being the international system governed by anarchy 
and the dynamics of accumulation of power and wealth, states are expansive 
and aim to improve and review their position in the international arena. 
According to Fiori (2004: 2008) competition and war are the engine of this 
power system, where all powers fight for global power and create order and 
disorder, expansion and crisis, peace and war.
 Furthermore, the control and access to territories (mainly of those 
rich in resources and with a strategic geopolitical position) has always been 
one of the central themes of the political game between states, as an element 
for maintaining or increasing power or for the survival in the international 
arena. As Spykman (1938, 9) affirms, since the geographic characteristics of 
states are relatively unalterable and immutable, the geographic demands of 
States have remained the same for centuries and, because the world has not 
yet reached “that happy state where the wants of no man conflict with those of 
another, those demands will cause friction. Thus, at the door of geography may 
be laid the blame for many of the age-long struggles which run persistently 
through history while governments and dynasties rise and fall”.
 China already figures as the largest economy in terms of GDP (IMF 
2020) and as the second country that spent the most on military power in 
2019 (SIPRI 2020), only trailing the USA. Such Chinese economic power has 
been consolidated since the end of the 20th century with the strategic project, 
the foreign policy interests of Deng Xiaoping (1978-1990) and, mainly, after 
China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. In fact, since 
the end of the 1990s, China’s growth has been vertiginous - at the beginning 
of the 21st century, it reached 10% per year and continued with high rates even 
after the 2008 crisis -, which has enabled its greater insertion and presence in 
the most diverse boards (Christensen 2015; Zhao 2015; Gallagher 2016).
 In the 21st century, as China grew, the world as a whole felt the 
impacts of its growth and of its consequent demand for natural resources 
and new markets to supply its development, which combined urbanization 
and industrialization. This development model was intensive in the use of 
mineral, energetic and metallic commodities (Hiratuka 2018). In this sense, 
Chinese demands have affected the countries of Latin America and Africa 
directly and indirectly, due to their effect on international prices. In addition, 
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its growth has also resulted in an increase in the number of investments in 
infrastructure projects and in the provision of loans to several countries in the 
Global South (Hiratuka 2018; Cintra; Medeiros 2015; Gallagher 2016).
 In the case of the Chinese military capabilities, in general terms, China 
is estimated to be the second country with the largest number of satellites, 
either both military or commercial. While the USA has 1,425 satellites, of 
which about 210 serve military purposes, China has 382 satellites in total 
and 114 of which are expressly used for military purposes (UCSUSA, 2020). 
When we analyze, for example, Chinese military capabilities from the nuclear 
point of view, China is the third country in nuclear warheads, with a total of 
320, behind only the USA (5,800) and Russia (6,375) (Armscontrol 2020).
 China has built its second icebreaker, the first being built entirely in 
China. The Xuelong 2 or Snow Dragon 2 together with Xuelong - the country’s 
first polar survey vessel, purchased from Ukraine in 1994 - undertook its 
first expedition to Antarctica in 2019. With Xuelong 2 - operated by the Polar 
Research Institute of the State Oceanic Administration - China equals the 
USA in number of icebreakers, but lags behind Russia, which already has 
more than 40 icebreakers operating in the Baltic and the Arctic (Woody 2020). 
From the point of view of maritime capabilities, China has been investing so 
that its navy (PLAN) can be present all around the world. China “plans to send 
military units wherever its global strategic interests require” (Zhou 2019). In 
total numbers, China already has the largest navy in the world, with a total of 
approximately 350 ships and submarines, including more than 130 surface 
combatants (DOD China 2020, 133). In addition, the 2019 Chinese white 
book presented that PLAN is streamlining the transition of its operations 
from “defense on the near seas” to “protection missions on the far seas” 
(Xinhua 2019). The China Military Power Report 2020 shows that China’s 
strategy includes the modernization program for Chinese military forces that 
seeks to complete this process by 2035 and transform the PLA into a high-
level military force (worldwide) by the end of 2049 (DOD China 2020, VII).
 In the case of the Antarctic territory, Anne-Marie Brady (2017, 224) 
argues that Chinese interests are increasing in the region as the country has 
sought to become a polar power in both the Arctic and the Antarctic regions. 
In fact, the more active Chinese behavior on other international boards has 
been the result of a comprehensive policy pursued by Xi Jinping. According 
to Sorensen (2013, 376), perceptions of the enhancement of Chinese relative 
power have increased nationalist ambitions and expectations among people 
who believe that China, now, after ‘100 years of humiliation’, should rise up 
and assume its position as a great power. In this sense, Xi Jinping’s “Chinese 
Dream” policy strategy is associated with the foreign policy of the Asian giant, 
The Dragon’s Footprints in the South Pole: A Study on Chinese Strategies and Actions in 
Antarctica and its Implications for Brazil
Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations
v.10, n.19, Jan./Jun. 2021
118
consisting of an example of the recovery speech of the Middle Country when 
it states that the great rejuvenation of the chinese nation is the biggest dream 
of the chinese nation in modern times (apud Xinhua 2013).
 The Antarctic region is protected by the ATS, as a multilateral treaty 
like we mentioned earlier, however, pessimistic speeches have emerged like 
that of Ellie Fogarty from the Australian Institute of International Policy 
in 2011. Fogarty stated that “major powers such as China and Russia have 
voiced their interest in the continent’s resource potential, strongly suggesting 
the current prohibition of resource exploitation will be revisited after 2048” 
(Fogarty 2011). Although the Chinese government has sought to present 
itself as a responsible and environmentally conscious country, as stated in Xi 
Jinping’s speech to the United Nations in late September 2020 - with a leading 
role in global governance (FMPRC 2020); this did not translate, for example, 
into a change in China’s policy in the Antarctic. The country has allied itself 
with Moscow to block the introduction of three marine areas to be protected 
in the Southern Ocean at the annual meeting of the Commission for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources in Antarctica (CCAMLR), 
held from 27 to 30 October. This position may be associated with the increase 
in Chinese interests and consumption by the Antarctic krill - a species of 
crustacean (Urch 2015). It should also be noted that fishing for Antarctic krill 
is part of the Chinese interest in expanding fishing in distant waters around 
the world’s oceans, as presented in the 13th annual plan regarding the issue of 
“Fishing in Distant Waters”4. The Shanghai Chonghe Marine Industry (CMI), 
for example, has ordered the largest trawler ever built to capture Antarctic 
krill which will be completed in 2023 (BairdMaritime 2020). Therefore, there 
are fears that the Antarctic international regime will start to collapse in the 
face of competitive pressure from the international system.
 Some researchers like Dodds (apud The Atlantic 2020) understand 
that the increase in Chinese demand for krill may also influence the Asian 
giant’s interest in other resources in the region. In Dodds’ words “fishing 
is a proxy for minerals”. Furthermore, despite the existence of the treaty, a 
geopolitical race for the region has already taken place and it emerges in the 
form of a dispute for scientific leadership and for the projection capacity 
towards the polar regions. Between 2001-2016, for example, China invested 
310 million yuan in its Antarctic program, eighteen times more if we consider 
the 1983-2000 program (Global Times 2017).
4 In general lines, there are three proposals for the creation of Marine Protected Areas (MPA) to be dis-
cussed. The oldest proposal is the protection of three blocks of ocean and ocean floor along East Antarctic, 
an area rich in cold water corals and penguin feeding areas. Also on the agenda was the creation of an 
MPA of 1.8 million km2 in the Weddell Sea area. Finally, there is a proposal to create an MPA west of the 
Antarctic peninsula.
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 With the increase in the capacities of States, intentions and interests 
may become more evident (Zakaria 1998). This point, as mentioned, can be 
seen in Chinese foreign policy which has become more assertive and active 
internationally (Zhao 2015; Oliveira 2019). Currently, China remains in 
agreement with the ATS regime and the possibility of the country seeking to 
extract resources in the region is still remote, given that it is a signatory of the 
Madrid Protocol. After 2048, would China be willing to renew its commitment 
to the non-exploitation and mining of resources in the Antarctic? So far, this 
question cannot be answered as Chinese strategies for the Antarctic continue 
to focus on research and the exploitation of living resources, like fishing, in 
the region.
 However, the considerable investments that China has been making 
at the South Pole may allow Beijing to position itself at the forefront of the 
resource race in Antarctica. According to Anne-Marie Brady (apud Atkin 
2015), Chinese documents are clear about Chinese interests in minerals in 
the Antarctic. According to the author, the material includes a 2005 report by 
members and former members of the Polar Research Institute of China. The 
report itself would say that the region has potential mineral resources, and that 
exploration was only a matter of time. In another 2013 report obtained from 
a confidential source by the author, it was stated that “regardless of how the 
spoils are divided up, China must have a share of Antarctic mineral resources 
to ensure the survival and development of its one billion population”. The 
researcher points out that for the Chinese much of the scientific research 
conducted in the Antarctic is a disguised form of presence and that many 
countries in the Antarctic are occupying bases that are not focused on scientific 
knowledge, but to invest in long-term strategic interests, including potential 
access to any resources that may be discovered (apud Atkin 2015).
 The possibility of an expansionist China in the Antarctic in the horizon 
is one of the scenarios to be thought about the future of the icy continent. It 
is noteworthy that this does not mean that only China could be a revisionist 
actor in the region’s treaty system, as far as the litigants countries themselves 
can unilaterally claim a part of the Antarctic territory. In the Brazilian case, 
the Antarctic presence is considered a geopolitical and geostrategic issue in 
the sphere of national interests. The South Atlantic is the main route to access 
the Antarctic continent and Brazil being the country with the longest Atlantic 
coast in the globe, the region is of vital interest to Brazil.
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The Antarctic´s Relevance to Brazil and the Implications of 
Chinese Actions in the Region
Historically, Brazil became a signatory to the Antarctic Treaty in 1975 
after the recommendations of João Frank da Costa, head of the Intellectual 
Cooperation Division and the highest authority of Itamaraty on Brazil’s 
Antarctic issues, and the favorable circumstances for its accession that year 
(Ferreira 2009, 127). Costa recommended that Brazilian policy towards the 
Antarctic should start with adherence to the Treaty and that Brazil should 
become a consultative member. The memorandum has been the basis of all 
Brazilian international positioning in Antarctic matters since then and guides 
Brazil’s position on the Antarctic region in the National Defense Plans (Brasil 
2005; 2012a; 2020) and in the National Defense Strategies (Brasil 2008; 
2012b; 2020). Currently, Brazil has a base the Antarctic, the Commander 
Ferraz base that was reopened in January 2020 after a fire destroyed it in 
2012, and currently has 17 laboratories in its base (Atkin 2015).
Figure 2: Brazilian Base Commander Ferraz
Source: Strategic Plan of the Brazilian Navy 2040 (2020).
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The Antarctic was included in the 2012 National Defense Policy (PND) 
in the country’s strategic surroundings. However, since the 2005 National 
Defense Policy and the 2008 National Defense Strategy, Antarctica was already 
included in the document as a region of interest to the Brazilian government. 
Since then, the importance of the Antarctic had grown, and this can be seen 
in the increasing mention of the term the Antarctic in the documents. As 
a brief comparison, while in the 2012 PND the Antarctic region receives a 
mention, in the PND launched in 2020, the region receives three mentions. 
In the last document dated of 2020 the Brazilian government is aware of the 
potential resources existing in the Antarctic continent and bases its national 
strategy on the need to protect such territory.
[...] the South America, the South Atlantic, the Antarctic and the African 
countries bordering the South Atlantic hold significant reserves of natural 
resources, in a world already aware of the scarcity of these assets. Such a 
scenario may give rise to conflicts in which the use of force or its support 
for the imposition of political and economic sanctions prevails. External 
powers have increased their presence and influence in these areas (Brasil 
2020, 17).
The Antarctic has played an important role in the Brazilian geopolitical 
debate since the end of the 20th century, having as its main thinkers authors 
such as Golbery do Couto e Silva (1967), Leonardo Mattos (2014), Therezinha 
de Castro (1976) and Meira Mattos (1976; 2011)5. Authors like Therezinha 
de Castro emphasized the role of the Antarctic and highlighted it as a key 
point for interoceanic maritime navigation, highlighting the importance of 
Antarctica for the defense of the South Atlantic - which is the region geo-
strategically delimited in the North by the 16N parallel, in the South by the 
Antarctic Continent, in the East by the African coast and in the West by 
South America (PND, 2012; 2020). The South Atlantic comprises four large 
archipelagos and islands of different sizes and importance, as well as different 
nationalities. The African coast stretches from Guinea-Bissau to the Cape, 
comprising sixteen countries. The American coast, on the other hand, starts 
at Cabo de São Roque and extends to the Cape of Tierra del Fuego. Its length 
5 In the works of Golbery, Meira Mattos e Therezinha de Castro, the Antarctic, gained relevance. Conside-
ring Castro´s thought there is a debate over the possibility of Brazil being able to project its influence in 
the region. In this sense, the first Brazilian movements to show some interest for the white continent, had 
developed in the 1950s within the framework of the “confrontation theory” (teoria da defrontação no origi-
nal, nota do editor) developed by Professors such as Therezinha de Castro, linked to the Brazilian Institute 
of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). This theory was never able to be translated into an official Itamaraty´s 
position, but it had some influence on Brazilian´s foreign policy, and was able to put the Antarctic into the 
political agendas of some leaders. 
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is 9,000 km and covers Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina (Fiori 2013; Oliveira; 
Netto 2016, 229).
 Due to its geographical characteristics, the South Atlantic basin 
allows the rapid maritime transport of large commercial volumes. Brazil 
has consolidated its position in the region through non-traditional programs 
of power projection with the development of public policies that encourage 
fishing, coastal shipping, scientific research, and tourism activities that 
had consolidated Brazilian participation and dominance of the territory. 
Approximately 95% of Brazilian international trade flows through these 
waters, a movement of more than US $ 229 billion per year. In addition, 90% 
of the country’s oil and gas production is generated on the continental shelves 
and 75% of Brazilian gas production comes from this maritime region (Fiori 
2013; Oliveira; Netto 2016, 230).
 The discoveries of these reserves in the region have generated a 
growing interest of countries such as the United Kingdom, the USA, Germany, 
France, Russia, China, and Japan. For the purpose of this article, China’s 
interest will be highlighted. Over the past decade, the Chinese presence in 
the South Atlantic has grown at a quantitative level, through the expansion 
of trade and investments in/with the region, as well as in the diaspora of 
the Chinese community in Latin America and Africa; at the qualitative level, 
the Chinese presence has grown through its intervention in fields other than 
economics, such as politics, culture and security (Abdenur 2013; Abdenur; 
Neto 2013).
 There are also multilateral strategies that have been adopted by Brazil 
with countries in the region in order to protect and safeguard their interests 
in the South Atlantic. It is worth mentioning, for example, the South Atlantic 
Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS)6 and the training carried out in the 
IBSA through trilateral cooperation between Brazil, India and South Africa, 
with IBSAMAR. Furthermore, in recent years there has been a growing 
tendency to expand and deepen multilateral cooperation between South 
American countries, especially during the Lula government (2003-2010). This 
was also observed in the context of the Antarctic programs, where in addition 
to a wide variety of bilateral technical and logistical support agreements, there 
are also multilateral initiatives such as the Latin American Antarctic Program 
Administrators Meeting (RAPAL), already in its XXXI edition (Ferreira 2009; 
RAPAL 2020).
6 The 24 countries that are part of ZOPACAS are South Africa, Angola, Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Cape 
Verde, Cameroon, Congo, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, 
Liberia, Namibia , Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, São Tomé e Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Togo and Uruguay.
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 In addition to the South Atlantic issue, the Antarctic affects significant 
routes for Brazilian maritime transport and the main access route to the 
Antarctic continent passes through the South Atlantic. Currently, a large part 
of the world maritime trade traffic uses controlled artificial accesses, like the 
case of the Panama Canal (connection between the Atlantic and the Pacific) 
and the Suez Canal (Mediterranean and Indian). Free access to these passages 
is subject to possible regional turbulence, which may result in the crossing 
being closed or restricted. Such restrictions increased the interest and the 
use of accesses in the south of the South American and African continents, 
through the Drake Passage and Cape Agulhas. The Drake Passage, which 
separates the Antarctic from the South American continent, has potential 
value as a maritime navigation route, given the vulnerability of the others 
(PEM 2040 2020).
 In fact, the official documents of the Brazilian government raise 
concerns about the uncertainties in the international arena. Issues related to 
the Antarctic can be seen not only in the END and PND, but also in the 2040 
Navy Strategic Plan.
South America, the Antarctic and West Africa have significant reserves of 
natural resources. In this strategic environment, with a focus on the South 
Atlantic, it is essential to consolidate the region as a Zone of Peace and 
Cooperation (ZOPACAS), in order to avoid interference from illegitimate 
interests. Political motivations, social conflicts, interests of economic 
groups and even of an ethnic and religious nature bring, as an underlying 
question, the search for energy, water, rare minerals and geographic space. 
In this sense, maritime spaces have become the object of dispute between 
States, paradoxically accentuated. Armed conflicts, now hybrid, in which 
the perpetrators of aggression and real interests are hidden, have not yet 
been abolished from international relations, with the dispute over resources 
as a strong motivating factor (PEM 2040 2020, 28).
However, the Antarctic program is still little explored by the Brazilian 
government, with investments still incipient if we take into account the 
increase in the interests of powers like China in the region. The annual cost of 
the Brazilian Antarctic Program (ProAntar) reaches the range of R$ 8 million 
per year, however in 2020, for example, the Brazilian budget for the program 
was only R$ 3.67 million, including parliamentary amendments (Câmara 
2020). In this sense, in recent years the PROANTAR has been carrying out 
its activities in the limit of the budget or even below (Camara 2017).
 In fact, Brazil has no shortage of strategic minerals, including oil, 
natural gas and even water, which means that it is very likely that the country 
The Dragon’s Footprints in the South Pole: A Study on Chinese Strategies and Actions in 
Antarctica and its Implications for Brazil
Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations
v.10, n.19, Jan./Jun. 2021
124
does not need to exploit these stockpiles within a predictable time horizon 
(Mattos 2014). However, considering the 2048 deadline for the possible 
revision of the Antarctic treaty, it is expected that countries that already had 
claimed territories in the Antarctic and others that operate there, such as the 
USA, China and India, for example, will begin to understand this region as 
a “living space” wishing that the commercial exploitation of the Antarctic´s 
strategic resources begin (Mattos 2014).
 For this reason, investments in S&T and in the maritime projection 
capacity would allow the expansion of initiatives to protect the Brazilian 
strategic environment. A protection that could be developed through closer 
ties with countries in South America, like Argentina and Chile that claim the 
Antarctic. The Brazilian lackluster is already observed in the relations with its 
neighbors, as the country is dependent on other South American countries in 
the Antarctic. Brazil does not have an air base in the Antarctic continent and 
needs to use the Chilean station President Eduardo Frei Montalva for landing 
and takeoff. The dependence is even more significant in the winter when the 
waters of the Admiralty Bay are frozen - Brazil does not have an icebreaker 
yet7 - and the logistics for carrying out the polar missions need to use the ports 
of Ushuaia and Punta Arenas (Hernandez 2018).
 In addition to the Antarctic issue, we can also add that there is an 
increase in economic and trade relation relations between China and Brazil. 
China is already Brazil’s main trading partner and in recent years it has 
invested mainly in strategic sectors focused on mineral and natural resources 
and infrastructure construction closely related to the Chinese interest in 
increasing the capacity for the flow of Brazilian goods (export corridors) 
(Santos et al 2020). Not only in Brazil, but in several other Latin American 
countries, China is already emerging as the main export destination (Santos 
et al 2020; Gallagher 2016). Such Chinese interests further demonstrate the 
Asian country’s dependence on resources, which strengthens fears that in 
the future its actions in the Antarctic will become more expansionist, causing 
an escalation of geopolitical in the region. This dispute already exists if we 
consider technological and scientific issues, as well as krill fishing in the 
region.
7 The Brazilian Navy is interested in building an icebreaker. If such a project translates into reality, it may 
bring changes to the capacity of Brazilian operations in the Antarctic. See more at: https://www.correiobra-
ziliense.com.br/app/noticia/brasil/2019/03/11/interna-brasil,742183/marinha-construira-navio-quebra-
-gelo-para-pesquisas-na-antartida.shtml 
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Final Remarks
China’s rise is changing global and regional geoeconomic and 
geopolitical scenarios. In the 21st century, China continues to grow and, at 
the same time, its demand for natural and mineral resources expanded. As a 
result, China has progressively projected itself internationally, increasing its 
capacity to act on the most diverse strategic theaters. The increase in Chinese 
demands for natural and strategic resources caused by its economic growth 
has been stimulating the Chinese presence in Africa and Latin America, as 
well as reviving tensions in the Eastern and Western China seas. Just as the 
increase in demand has been stimulating geopolitical disputes around the 
world, there are fears about the Antarctic regime which may collapse both in 
the face of the change in the balance of power, and in view of the 2048 time 
frame itself.
 The changes in the balance of power in the international arena have 
revived geopolitical disputes and directed the debate towards China’s behavior 
at a time of relative decline of American power. Concerns about a threatening 
and expansive China are common in Western debates on international 
relations and, above all, in the framework of theories that dialogue, in some 
way, with realism. In the present article in the light of concepts and evaluations 
presented by classical geopolitics, realist theories and the theory of global 
power, China’s performance in the Antarctic and of its foreign policy may 
lead to looming prospects for the region. This is not to say that China could 
be the sole or the main disruptive player in the region as the United States, 
Russia and other litigant nations can offer similar pressures. The USA itself, 
for example, has shown itself to be an expansionist and destructive player of 
the pillars and regimes it had created (or helped to create) since the end of 
World War II. The increase in the presence of great powers in the Antarctic 
intensifies the dynamics of power and security in the region and can promote 
more evident competitive clashes. After all, following the theories presented 
here, all countries seek to increase their power and wealth in the international 
arena in the face of the anarchy of the international system.
 The increase in the Chinese presence can be seen by the increasing 
investments in S&T, the construction of new bases, the elevation in the 
number of tourists and in krill fishing in the region. In this context, we note 
that China has invested more and more in the region and has, at times, 
opposed the creation of new rules for the protection of biodiversity and of 
the Antarctic territories - such as krills fishing. In addition, China has been 
investing in polar technologies and emerging as a leader, behind Russia and 
the USA.
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 The article has argued that fears that were present regarding the 
Antarctic issue in the past, about the clashes for resources, continue and have 
been intensified with the increase in the number of players in the region. This 
reality allows us to consider the increased competition in the Antarctic and, 
consequently, tensions and disputes that will involve countries in the near 
future. This article outlined the Chinese interests and actions that are being 
developed for the Antarctic. However, it remains to be seen whether the Asian 
giant will present a more assertive strategy for the Antarctic, just as it did for 
the Arctic.
 Nevertheless, the increase in Chinese investments and activities in 
the region are already affecting the balance of power in the Antarctic and 
for Brazil. The expansion of the Chinese presence in the region, as well as 
the possible tensions involving the Antarctic may become a problem for the 
achievement of Brazilian strategy. After all, the maritime crossing of the South 
Atlantic is the main access route to the Antarctic. Conflicts that may emerge 
in the Antarctic would take place in the Brazilian strategic environment, 
affecting not only its interests, but its international security.
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The starting point of the article is the perception of the relevant role that China has 
been gaining in the international arena and the competitive and geopolitical pressure 
that it has been exercising in the most diverse international strategic theaters, 
including in the Polar Regions – Arctic and Antarctic. Considering the relevance of the 
Antarctic, the present article analyzes the Chinese strategy and its growing presence 
in the Antarctic and its implications for Brazil, using the theoretical frameworks of 
classical geopolitics, realism, and the theory of global power.
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